<\/span><\/p>\nSince then, for over 40 years, despite many changes in the State of Israel, the Law of Return has remained unchanged. The High Court of Justice, in turn, filled the void left by the legislator and continued the development of the interpretation of the law. Cases brought before the Supreme Court\u00a0 addressing the question of who is a Jew entitled to Aliyah, especially regarding Messianic Jews, or various conversions to Judaism which are not Orthodox.<\/p>\n
To summarize: in judicial precedent, those who undergo a Reform or Conservative conversion to Judaism are counted as Jews for the purpose of the Law of Return. However Messianic Jews are not considered as Jews for the same purpose, rather are regarded as Christians who don’t have the right to make aliyah after conversion to Christianity.<\/p>\n
Those defined as “members of another religion” are not entitled to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return<\/h2>\n
Supreme Court decisions regarding the right to immigrate to Israel after conversion, most notably Beresford (1987) and Kendall (1990) determined that a Messianic Jew is considered to be a Christian. Therefore, a Messianic Jew is considered a “member of another religion”, and not entitled to making Aliyah after conversion to Christianity. The Supreme Court’s rulings on the subject presented two schools of thought, representing different approaches to understanding the Israeli legal system. Justice Alon’s approach, which is based on the world of Judaism and Jewish law, contrasts with the liberal, secular, national viewpoint of Justice Barak. Despite the different theoretical approaches, both judges reached the same conclusion – a Messianic Jew (ie, the child of a Jewish mother who believes that Jesus is the Messiah of Israel) is of “another religion” rather than Judaism.<\/p>\n
Justice Alon supported his claims with sources in Judaic tradition, which claim that a “convert” is not part of the Jewish people, and therefore is not entitled to join the Jewish state.Justice Barak expressed his opinion that even according to a secular outlook there is general agreement that “a Jew who believes in Jesus” is no longer a Jew, according to the national meaning of the term. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\nApplication to make Aliyah after conversion to Christianity – the Zevidovsky verdict<\/span><\/span><\/h2>\nThese legal precedents regarding\u00a0Aliyah after conversion to Christianity were facing Justice Hendel when he deciding the case of Ms. Zevidovsky. The applicant was born in Israel, to Jewish parents who survived the Holocaust. Later in life she was baptized – as an adult of her own free will – and married a Christian man in a Catholic church in 1975. After that she left Israel and renounced her Israeli citizenship. Years later, Ms. Zevidovsky decided to return to Israel, and asked for the right of Aliyah to Israel and Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return. She claimed she never gave up her Jewish identity. Ms. Zevidovsky primarily claim was that the conversion was merely an ostensible one, for the purpose of the marriage, so she never actually converted to Christianity, and should not be considered “of another religion.” Secondly, Ms. Zevidovsky received a ruling regarding her return to Judaism by the Rabbinical Court in Tel Aviv. If so, the question before the court was whether she was now entitled to make Aliyah after conversion to Christianity, based on the Law of Return, and to receive Israeli citizenship?<\/p>\n
Justice Hendel mentions the unresolved dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the term “member of another religion,” but criticizes both the possibility of interpreting the Law of Return without the use of Hebrew law, while ignoring Jewish religious tradition, and a complete reliance upon religious tradition for interpreting Israeli law.<\/p>\n
Hendel offers an alternative “practical approach”, based on Hebrew law in its broad sense, which takes into account behavior, awareness, statements and the willingness of a person to assimilate within the other religion. According to Judge Hendel, due to discomfort with the phenomenon of apostates, Jewish law does not offer an exact definition based on clear criteria for defining a Jew who converted to another religion. However, the absence of a desire to classify this category does not indicate a lack of condemnation thereof. The picture of conversion that emerges in Rabbinic literature involves the adoption of extreme measures of assimilation in the other religion, maintaining the customs, laws and way of life of members of the other religion. It should be noted that it is not enough to have shared philosophies and worldviews with members of the other religion, because the very meaning of the term “conversion” emphasizes a shared system of belief and worship. In view of the above, his honor states that the facts of the specific case indicate that the Petitioner presented herself as a member of another religion, participated in major Christian ceremonies, was aware of their meaning and belonged to the Catholic Church for years, and therefore is not Jewish under the Law of Return.<\/p>\n
In conclusion, Hendel raises a fundamental question; Can a Jew revert to Judaism after being a member of another religion? Although the law does not address this situation explicitly, the judge argues that Jewish law recognizes the ability of each person to change, and the gates of repentance are open to all. Therefore, the judge ruled that Ms. Zevidovsky may submit a new application for immigration, which will be examined on a factual basis.<\/p>\n
Justice Rubinstein supported Justice Hendel’s ruling, with a comprehensive historical survey of the attitude of Judaism toward converts who removed themselves from among the people of Israel. However, he also held that Jewish law did not rule out the return of the convert to Judaism. Therefore, while the ability to make\u00a0Aliyah after conversion to Christianity was denied to the petitioner, the High Court allowed future applicants to retain their hopes.<\/p>\n
The High Court of Justice ruling in the matter of Ms. Zevidovsky thus teaches that an integral part of the attempt to define who is a Jew is to delimit the boundaries by answering the question of “who is not a Jew”. Every judge approaches this complex interpretation, in accordance with his standards and his outlook on Israeli law, and especially his perception of the proper relationship between Hebrew law and the State of Israel as “Jewish and democratic.” <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n